In the paper it is argued that bridging the digital divide may cause a new ethical and social dilemma. Using Hardin's Tragedy of the Commons, we show that an improper opening and enlargement of the digital environment (Infosphere) is likely to produce a Tragedy of the Digital Commons (TDC). In the course of the analysis, we explain why Adar and Huberman's previous use of Hardin's Tragedy to interpret certain recent phenomena in the Infosphere (especially peer-to-peer communication) may not be entirely (...) satisfactory. We then seek to provide an improved version of the TDC that avoids the possible shortcomings of their model. Next, we analyse some problems encountered by the application of classical ethics in the resolution of the TDC. In the conclusion, we outline the kind of work that will be required to develop an ethical approach that may bridge the digital divide but avoid the TDC. (shrink)

In this paper we introduce three methods to approach philosophical problems informationally: Minimalism, the Method of Abstraction and Constructionism. Minimalism considers the specifications of the starting problems and systems that are tractable for a philosophical analysis. The Method of Abstraction describes the process of making explicit the level of abstraction at which a system is observed and investigated. Constructionism provides a series of principles that the investigation of the problem must fulfil once it has been fully characterised by the previous (...) two methods. For each method, we also provide an application: the problem of visual perception, functionalism, and the Turing Test, respectively. (shrink)

We propose a nonmonotonic Description Logic of typicality able to account for the phenomenon of the combination of prototypical concepts. The proposed logic relies on the logic of typicality ALC + TR, whose semantics is based on the notion of rational closure, as well as on the distributed semantics of probabilistic Description Logics, and is equipped with a cognitive heuristic used by humans for concept composition. We first extend the logic of typicality ALC + TR by typicality inclusions of the (...) form p :: T(C) v D, whose intuitive meaning is that “we believe with degree p about the fact that typical Cs are Ds”. As in the distributed semantics, we define different scenarios containing only some typicality inclusions, each one having a suitable probability. We then exploit such scenarios in order to ascribe typical properties to a concept C obtained as the combination of two prototypical concepts. We also show that reasoning in the proposed Description Logic is EXPTIME-complete as for the underlying standard Description Logic ALC. (shrink)

We propose a nonmonotonic Description Logic of typicality able to account for the phenomenon of combining prototypical concepts, an open problem in the fields of AI and cognitive modelling. Our logic extends the logic of typicality ALC + TR, based on the notion of rational closure, by inclusions p :: T(C) v D (“we have probability p that typical Cs are Ds”), coming from the distributed semantics of probabilistic Description Logics. Additionally, it embeds a set of cognitive heuristics for concept (...) combination. We show that the complexity of reasoning in our logic is EXPTIME-complete as in ALC. (shrink)

Across two studies, one of which was pre-registered, we find that a simple questionnaire that measures intellectual virtue and vice predicts how many fake news articles and conspiracy theories participants accept. This effect holds even when controlling for multiple demographic predictors, including age, household income, sex, education, ethnicity, political affiliation, religion, and news consumption. These results indicate that self-report is an adequate way to measure intellectual virtue and vice, which suggests that they are not fully immune to introspective awareness or (...) “stealthy” in the sense that Cassam (2015) argues. This is an important methodological result and may pave the way for future research on intellectual virtue and vice. (shrink)

The present PhD thesis is concerned with the question whether good reasoning requires that the subject has some cognitive grip on the relation between premises and conclusion. One consideration in favor of such a requirement goes as follows: In order for my belief-formation to be an instance of reasoning, and not merely a causally related sequence of beliefs, the process must be guided by my endorsement of a rule of reasoning. Therefore I must have justified beliefs about the relation between (...) my premises and my conclusion. -/- The rationality of a belief often depends on whether it is rightly connected to other beliefs, or more generally to other mental states —the states capable of providing a reason to holding the belief in question. For instance, some rational beliefs are connected to other beliefs by being inferred from them. It is often accepted that the connection implies that the subject in some sense ‘takes the mental states in question to be reason-providing’. But views on how exactly this is to be understood differ widely. They range from interpretations according to which ‘taking a mental state to be reason-providing’ imposes a mere causal sustaining relation between belief and reason-providing state to interpretations according to which one ‘takes a mental state to be reason-providing’ only if one believes that the state is reason-providing. The most common worry about the latter view is that it faces a vicious regress. In this thesis a different but in some respects similar interpretation of ‘taking something as reason-providing’ is given. It is argued to consist of a disposition to react in certain ways to information that challenges the reason-providing capacity of the allegedly reason-providing state. For instance, that one has inferred A from B partly consists in being disposed to suspend judgment about A if one obtains a reason to believe that B does not render A probable. The account is defended against regress-objections and the suspicion of explanatory circularity. (shrink)

Why are mistaken beliefs about Covid-19 so prevalent? Political identity, education and other demographic variables explain only a part of individual differences in the susceptibility to Covid-19 misinformation. This paper focuses on another explanation: epistemic vice. Epistemic vices are character traits that interfere with acquiring, maintaining, and transmitting knowledge. If the basic assumption of vice epistemology is right, then people with epistemic vices such as indifference to the truth or rigidity in their belief structures will tend to be more susceptible (...) to believing Covid-19 misinformation. We carried out an observational study (US sample, n = 998) in which we measured the level of epistemic vice of participants using a novel Epistemic Vice Scale. We also asked participants questions eliciting the extent to which they subscribe to myths and misinformation about Covid-19. We find overwhelming evidence to the effect that epistemic vice is associated with susceptibility to Covid-19 misinformation. In fact, the association turns out to be stronger than with political identity, educational attainment, scores on the Cognitive Reflection Test, personality, dogmatism, and need for closure. We conclude that this offers evidence in favor of the empirical presuppositions of vice epistemology. (shrink)

AI-based technologies are increasingly pervasive in a number of contexts. Our affective and emotional life makes no exception. In this article, we analyze one way in which AI-based technologies can affect them. In particular, our investigation will focus on affective artificial agents, namely AI-powered software or robotic agents designed to interact with us in affectively salient ways. We build upon the existing literature on affective artifacts with the aim of providing an original analysis of affective artificial agents and their distinctive (...) features. We argue that, unlike comparatively low-tech affective artifacts, affective artificial agents display a specific form of agency, which prevents them from being perceived by their users as extensions of their selves. In addition to this, we claim that their functioning crucially depends on the simulation of human-like emotion-driven behavior and requires a distinctive form of transparency—we call it emotional transparency—that might give rise to ethical and normative tensions. (shrink)

The purpose of this article is to examine two important issues concerning the agency theory of causality: the charge of anthropomorphism and the relation of simultaneous causation. After a brief outline of the agency theory, sections 2–4 contain the refutation of the three main forms in which the charge of anthropomorphism is to be found in the literature. It will appear that it is necessary to distinguish between the subjective and the objective aspect of the concept of causation. This will (...) lead, in section 5, to contrast two kinds of anthropomorphism, one which has been rightly rejected by modern science and one which is fully compatible with the objective reality of the causal processes. Finally, section 6 will apply the preceding considerations to simultaneous causation. On the one hand, in a basic sense, there can be no simultaneous causal relations. On the other hand, simultaneous causation arises when we consider the natural change by abstracting from the agent and from her/his projects of interven.. (shrink)

The notion of schema has been given a major role by Recanati within his conception of primary pragmatic processes, conceived as a type of associative process. I intend to show that Recanati’s considerations on schemata may challenge the relevance theorist’s argument against associative explanations in pragmatics, and support an argument in favor of associative (versus inferential) explanations. More generally, associative relations can be shown to be schematic, that is, they have enough structure to license inferential effects without any appeal to (...) genuine inferential processes. Associative processes are thus able to explain a number of pragmatic and linguistic phenomena which have instead been thought to require specialized inferential processes. (shrink)

Husserl’s phenomenology of imagination embraces a cluster of different theories and approaches regarding the multi-faced phenomenon of imaginative experience. In this paper I consider one aspect that seems to be crucial to the understanding of a particular form of imagination that Husserl names pure phantasy. I argue that the phenomenon of Ego-splitting discloses the best way to elucidate the peculiarity of pure phantasy with respect to other forms of representative acts and to any simple form of act modification. First, I (...) unravel the phenomenological distinctions which, respectively, oppose phantasy to perception, on the one hand, and phantasy to other forms of the so-called “intuitive re-presentations”. Second, I introduce the difference between presentative and representative acts, arguing that this cannot help us to single out the defining feature of phantasy experiences. The third section draws again an important distinction between pure phantasy and neutrality modification, which allows me to finally determine an internal trait of phantasy experiences, which Husserl refers to as the “Ego-splitting”. In this way, I hope to contribute to a refined characterization of Husserl’s phenomenology of imagination. (shrink)

Some philosophers search for the mark of the cognitive: a set of individually necessary and jointly sufficient conditions identifying all instances of cognition. They claim that the mark of the cognitive is needed to steer the development of cognitive science on the right path. Here, I argue that, at least at present, it cannot be provided. First (§2), I identify some of the factors motivating the search for a mark of the cognitive, each yielding a desideratum the mark is supposed (...) to satisfy (§2.1). I then (§2.2) highlight a number of tensions in the literature on the mark of the cognitive, suggesting they’re best resolved by distinguishing two distinct programs. The first program (§3) is that of identifying a mark of the cognitive capturing our everyday notion of cognition. I argue that such a program is bound to fail for a number of reasons: it is not clear whether such an everyday notion exists; and even if it existed, it would not be able to spell out individually necessary and jointly sufficient conditions for cognition; and even if it were able to spell them out, these conditions won’t satisfy the desiderata a mark of the cognitive should satisfy. The second program is that of identifying a mark of the cognitive spelling out a genuine scientific kind. But the current state of fragmentation of cognitive science, and the fact that it is splintered in a myriad of different research traditions, prevent us from identifying such a kind. And we have no reason to think that these various research traditions will converge, allowing us to identify a single mark. Or so, at least, I will argue in (§4). I then conclude the paper (§5) deflecting an intuitive objection, and exploring some of the consequences of the thesis I have defended. (shrink)

Structural representations are increasingly popular in philosophy of cognitive science. A key virtue they seemingly boast is that of meeting Ramsey's job description challenge. For this reason, structural representations appear tailored to play a clear representational role within cognitive architectures. Here, however, I claim that structural representations do not meet the job description challenge. This is because even our most demanding account of their functional profile is satisfied by at least some receptors, which paradigmatically fail the job description challenge. Hence, (...) the functional profile typically associated with structural representations does not identify representational posits. After a brief introduction, I present, in the second section of the paper, the job description challenge. I clarify why receptors fail to meet it and highlight why, as a result, they should not be considered representations. In the third section I introduce what I take to be the most demanding account of structural representations at our disposal, namely Gładziejewski's account. Provided the necessary background, I turn from exposition to criticism. In the first half of the fourth section, I equate the functional profile of structural representations and receptors. To do so, I show that some receptors boast, as a matter of fact, all the functional features associated with structural representations. Since receptors function merely as causal mediators, I conclude structural representations are mere causal mediators too. In the second half of the fourth section I make this conclusion intuitive with a toy example. I then conclude the paper, anticipating some objections my argument invites. (shrink)

The role of conscious attention in language processing has been scarcely considered, despite the wide-spread assumption that verbal utterances manage to attract and manipulate the addressee’s attention. Here I claim that this assumption is to be understood not as a figure of speech but instead in terms of attentional processes proper. This hypothesis can explain a fact that has been noticed by supporters of Relevance Theory in pragmatics: the special role played by speaker-related information in utterance interpretation. I argue that (...) representation of the speaker in working memory reliably enhances the activation of speaker-related information and, consequently, the role it plays in determining the content of interpretations. (shrink)

According to some critics, Aristotle’s elenctic defence (elenchos, elenchus) of the Law of Non-Contradiction (Metaphysics IV) would be ineffective because it viciously begs the question. After briefly recalling the elenctic refutation of the denier of the Law of Non-Contradiction, I will first focus on Filippo Costantini’s objection to the elenchus, which, in turn, is based on the dialetheic account of negation developed by Graham Priest. Then, I will argue that there is at least one reading of the elenchus that might (...) not be viciously question-begging. In doing so, I will leverage, reinterpret and adjust the distinction between two senses of epistemic dependence, offered by Noah Lemos and originally based on some thoughts about George Edward Moore’s ‘proof of an external world.’ The key point of my counter-objection to recover the elenchus is to use the distinction between a necessary-condition relation between propositions (p only if q) and a grounding relation between facts (the fact that an epistemic agent S believes that p is grounded in the fact that S believes that q), where p and q are the content of S’s beliefs. (shrink)

This paper treats of Husserl’s phenomenology of happiness or eudaimonia in five parts. In the first part, we argue that phenomenology of happiness is an important albeit relatively neglected area of research, and we show that Husserl engages in it. In the second part, we examine the relationship between phenomenological ethics and virtue ethics. In the third part, we identify and clarify essential aspects of Husserl’s phenomenology of happiness, namely, the nature of the question concerning happiness and the possibility of (...) a phenomenological answer, the power of the will, the role of vocation, the place of obligation, the significance of habituation, the necessity of selfreflection and self-criticism, the importance of sociability and solidarity, the impact of chance and destiny, and the specter of regret. In the fourth part, we establish the inextricable linkage between Husserl’s metaethics and his metaphysics. In the fi ft h part, we provide a provisional exploration of his conception of the connection between happiness and blessedness. We acknowledge that there is an extensive literature on Husserl’s phenomenological ethics, and our study has benefitted greatly from it, but we also suggest that our holistic approach critically clarifies his description of happiness, virtue, and blessedness by fully recognizing that his phenomenological metaethics is embedded in his phenomenological metaphysics. (shrink)

I discuss Clark’s predictive processing/extended mind hybrid, diagnosing a problem: Clark’s hybrid suggests that, when we use them, we pay attention to mind-extending external resources. This clashes with a commonly accepted necessary condition of cognitive extension; namely, that mind-extending resources must be phenomenally transparent when used. I then propose a solution to this problem claiming that the phenomenal transparency condition should be rejected. To do so, I put forth a parity argument to the effect that phenomenal transparency cannot be a (...) necessary condition on cognitive extension: roughly, since internal cognitive resources can fail to be transparent when used, by parity, external resources can fail to be phenomenally transparent too. Further, I argue that phenomenal transparency is not even a reliable indicator of cognitive extension; hence its absence should not be considered a problem for Clark’s extended mind-predictive processing hybrid. Lastly, I consider and allay a number of worries my proposal might raise, and conclude the paper. (shrink)

The extended mind thesis claims that a subject’s mind sometimes encompasses the environmental props the subject interacts with while solving cognitive tasks. Recently, the debate over the extended mind has been focused on Markov Blankets: the statistical boundaries separating biological systems from the environment. Here, I argue such a focus is mistaken, because Markov Blankets neither adjudicate, nor help us adjudicate, whether the extended mind thesis is true. To do so, I briefly introduce Markov Blankets and the free energy principle (...) in Section 2. I then turn from exposition to criticism. In Section 3, I argue that using Markov Blankets to determine whether the mind extends will provide us with an answer based on circular reasoning. In Section 4, I consider whether Markov Blankets help us track the boundaries of the mind, answering in the negative. This is because resorting to Markov Blankets to track the boundaries of the mind yields extensionally inadequate conclusions which violate the parity principle. In Section 5, I further argue that Markov Blankets led us to sidestep the debate over the extended mind, as they make internalism about the mind vacuously true. A brief concluding paragraph follows. (shrink)

A view that emancipates free will by means of quantum indeterminism is frequently rejected based on arguments pointing out its incompatibility with what we know about quantum physics. However, if one carefully examines what classical physical causal determinism and quantum indeterminism are according to physics, it becomes clear what they really imply–and, especially, what they do not imply–for agent-causation theories. Here, we will make necessary conceptual clarifications on some aspects of physical determinism and indeterminism, review some of the major objections (...) against libertarian conjectures, and show that there is no conceptual incompatibility preventing us from taking a ‘quantum-libertarian’ approach to the problem of free will. In particular, we will illustrate the possible role of self-causation (causa sui) as a potential solution to otherwise apparently incompatible or even paradoxical statements concerning free will and quantum indeterminism. (shrink)

The aim of this article is to examine Duns Scotus’ account of divine omnipotence. I shall firstly consider his doctrine of the objective possible and the distinction between logical potency and metaphysical potency. Secondly, by drawing on Scotus’ main texts on divine omnipotence (especially the Quodlibet VII), I will argue that, in his view, God’s omnipotence is not demonstrable, but at the same time is not an irrational concept, as Aristotle and many Medieval philosophi claimed. Finally, I shall discuss the (...) connection between Scotus’ theory of being and that of the superiority of the will over the intellect. (shrink)

O artigo busca apresentar as relações entre as exigências de cuidado-da-alma e a necessidade do conhecimento-de-si presentes no diálogo platônico Primeiro Alcibíades, indicando a forte ligação de tal aperfeiçoamento de si com o da pólis. Também as dimensões erótica, teológica, ética e política se encontram firmemente unidas no diálogo, visto que a formação do homem político exige o vínculo entre discípulo e mestre, sendo este o guia em direção ao reconhecimento da divindade, pois conhecer-se significa, ao final, conhecer a alma (...) e, na alma, o deus. A alma assim formada saberá conduzir-se como se deve, e será capaz de governar a si e à cidade. (shrink)

Many philosophers claim that the neurocomputational framework of predictive processing entails a globally inferentialist and representationalist view of cognition. Here, I contend that this is not correct. I argue that, given the theoretical commitments these philosophers endorse, no structure within predictive processing systems can be rightfully identified as a representational vehicle. To do so, I first examine some of the theoretical commitments these philosophers share, and show that these commitments provide a set of necessary conditions the satisfaction of which allows (...) us to identify representational vehicles. Having done so, I introduce a predictive processing system capable of active inference, in the form of a simple robotic “brain”. I examine it thoroughly, and show that, given the necessary conditions highlighted above, none of its components qualifies as a representational vehicle. I then consider and allay some worries my claim could raise. I consider whether the anti-representationalist verdict thus obtained could be generalized, and provide some reasons favoring a positive answer. I further consider whether my arguments here could be blocked by allowing the same representational vehicle to possess multiple contents, and whether my arguments entail some extreme form of revisionism, answering in the negative in both cases. A quick conclusion follows. (shrink)

Introduzione alla raccolta di saggi di Rahel Jaeggi "Forme di vita e capitalismo", curata e tradotta da Marco Solinas. L'introduzione presenta una breve panoramica del pensiero dell'autrice e si sofferma sul suo progetto incentrato sulla critica immanente del capitalismo come forma di vita.

Some philosophers argue that a theory of logical validity should not interpret its own language, because a Russellian argument shows that self-applicability is inconsistent with the ability to capture all the interpretations of its own language. First, I set up a formal system to examine the Russellian argument. I then defend the need for self-applicability. I argue that self-applicability seems to be implied by generality, and that the Russellian argument rests on a test for meaning that is biased against self-applicability. (...) I propose an alternative test which is unproblematic for self-applicability. I conclude that self-applicability can be vindicated and the Russellian argument can be resisted. (shrink)

[This is a pre-print; please cite the published version] This paper employs structural topic modeling (STM) to describe the academic philosophy landscape in Brazil. Based on a public national database, a corpus consisting of 12,515 abstracts of monographs defended in philosophy graduate programs between 1991 and 2021 was compiled. The final STM model identified 74 meaningful research topics, clustered into 7 thematic categories. This study discusses the prevalence of the most significant topics and categories, their trends across three decades, and (...) their (positive or negative) association with the supervisor's gender. Results show the first empirical evidence that Brazilian philosophical research exhibits a greater focus on philosophers than on specific themes or problems. Moreover, by visualizing the variations in topic prevalence over time, it was possible to track the rise or decline of the major interest categories and topics. Finally, results also show which topics are more influenced or less influenced by gender. (shrink)

Nel corso del Novecento l’uso dei modelli matematici, che si era già rivelato così utile in fisica e ingegneria, è stato introdotto, talvolta con difficoltà non trascurabili, anche in discipline tradizionalmente considerate poco adatte ad un simile approccio, quali l’economia, la sociologia, la biologia. Un percorso che inizia prendendo a prestito molte delle idee e dei modelli della fisica, tanto che nel discorso inaugurale dell’anno accademico 1901-1902 all’Università di Roma il grande fisico matematico Vito Volterra (1860- 1940) pronunciava le seguenti (...) parole: «è intorno a quelle scienze nelle quali le matematiche solo da poco tempo hanno tentato d’introdursi, le scienze biologiche e sociali, che è più intensa la curiosità, giacché è forte il desiderio di assicurarsi se i metodi classici, i quali hanno dato così grandi risultati nelle scienze meccanico-fisiche, sono suscettibili di essere trasportati con pari successo nei nuovi ed inesplorati campi che si dischiudono loro dinanzi». In effetti l’economia arriverà, nel corso della prima metà del secolo, a un’elegante formulazione assiomatico-deduttiva della teoria dell’equilibrio economico, con l’utilizzo di metodi matematici eleganti e sofisticati. Ma le ipotesi di base, che coinvolgono concetti legati alle scelte degli individui influenzate dal loro livello di razionalità, influenzate da componenti psicologiche e interazioni sociali, condizionano fortemente i risultati ottenuti, e tuttora molti ritengono che il fatto che i metodi matematici si siano rivelati così utili in fisica non implica che lo siano anche per l’economia e le scienze sociali. La formalizzazione sempre più astratta di tali modelli, insieme alla loro difficoltà a spiegare e prevedere alcuni fenomeni economici e sociali osservati, ha portato a frequenti polemiche sulla reale opportunità di trasformare le discipline sociali in teorie matematiche, con strumenti che talvolta sembrano impiegati come fine a se stessi. In questo articolo, dopo aver brevemente delineato la storia della progressiva matematizzazione dell’economia, ci si concentrerà soprattutto sull’utilizzo in economia dei modelli dinamici non lineari, anche questi sviluppati inizialmente in fisica. Si tratta di modelli deterministici utilizzati per prevedere, ed eventualmente controllare, l’evoluzione temporale di sistemi reali. Basati su equazioni di evoluzione, espresse mediante equazioni differenziali o alle differenze a seconda che si consideri il tempo continuo o discreto, il loro studio qualitativo permette di ottenere informazioni sul tipo di comportamento che emergerà nel lungo periodo, e di come questo è influenzato dai principali parametri. La scoperta che modelli dinamici non lineari (che sono la regola nei sistemi sociali, caratterizzati da interazioni e meccanismi di feed-back) possono esibire comportamenti denotati col termine di caos deterministico per la proprietà di amplificare in modo difficilmente prevedibile perturbazioni arbitrariamente piccole (la cosiddetta sensitività rispetto alle condizioni iniziali, o “effetto farfalla”) ha suscitato un certo imbarazzo e nel contempo creato nuove possibilità. L’imbarazzo è dovuto al fatto che, come descriveremo meglio in seguito, la presenza di caos deterministico rende insostenibile l’ipotesi di agente economico razionale, ovvero capace di prevedere correttamente. Le nuove possibilità sono legate al fatto che quei sistemi economici e sociali caratterizzati da fluttuazioni in apparenza casuali potrebbero essere governati da leggi del moto deterministiche (anche se non lineari). In ogni caso, gli studi sui sistemi dinamici non lineari hanno portato a distinguere fra la rappresentazione matematica deterministica e la prevedibilità. L’attuale crisi economica ha senz’altro contribuito a riaccendere il dibattito sul modo di studiare i sistemi economici e sociali e la capacità di spiegare e prevedere. Le scienze sociali, e in particolare l’economia, sono davvero una scienza? Come può una scienza non prevedere e non accorgersi di quello che sta succedendo? Si tratta, come vedremo nel seguito, di domande ricorrenti, e anche in questa occasione qualcuno ha detto che, inseguendo i formalismi matematici, si sta perdendo di vista la realtà, mentre altri sostengono che il problema sta negli specifici formalismi adottati, che quelli usati sono superati, legati ad una matematica “vecchia”, magari mutuata in modo acritico da altre discipline. La speranza è allora che la crisi economica comporti un cambio di paradigma anche nella modellizzazione matematica. (shrink)

Der vorliegende Aufsatz behandelt zwei Bereiche, deren Zusammenhang in der aktuellen Husserlforschung zu Unrecht in Vergessenheit geraten zu sein scheint: Zum einen konturiere ich den Habitusbegriff und das damit verbundene Problem der Habituskonstitution im Spätwerk E. Husserls. Zum anderen dient das Ergebnis dieser ersten Untersuchung dann als Grundlage für die Frage nach dem Wesen des Ich in der genetischen Phänomenologie. Die Untersuchung besteht aus drei Teilen: Zuerst stelle ich, um die Bedeutung des Begriffs „Habitus“ zu klären, Ingardens Interpretationsalternativen der Habituskonstitution (...) vor. Im Anschluss daran werde ich mich mit dem sogenannten „transzendentalen Okkasionalismus“ befassen, der eine der zuvor vorgestellten Alternativen Ingardens aufgreift und weiterführt. Der „transzendentale Okkasionalismus“ vertritt die These, dass die habituellen Eigenschaften des Ich durch den einfachen Vollzug der Akte entstünden. Weil diese These als Interpretation des Habitusbegriffs bei Husserl weit verbreitet ist, muss sie als Lösungsansatz in Erwägung gezogen werden. Jedoch zeigt eine genaue Lektüre der Forschungsmanuskripte Husserls, dass dieser scheinbare Lösungsansatz einen dort wichtigen Begriff außer Acht lässt: die „Geschichte des Ich“. Diese wird im dritten und letzten Teil dieses Aufsatzes näher betrachtet und erläutert. Husserl selbst hob nämlich einen wesenhaften Zusammenhang zwischen den mannigfaltigen Erfahrungen des Ich hervor, durch den die Bezeichnung der Habituskonstitution als „Okkasionalismus“ nicht zutreffend sein kann. Aus diesem Grund geht dieser Beitrag über die reine Wiedergabe der Habitusproblematik in Husserls Phänomenologie hinaus und beschreibt eine Auffassung der transzendentalen Subjektivität, die aus dem Spätwerk Husserls stammt. (shrink)

We intoduce a novel extension of Description Logics (DLs) of typicality by means of probabilities able to represent and reason about typical properties and defeasible inheritance in DLs.

Higher-order evidence appears to have the ability to defeat rational belief. It is not obvious, however, why exactly the defeat happens. In this paper, I consider two competing explanations of higher-order defeat: the “Objective Higher-Order Defeat Explanation” and the “Subjective Higher-Order Defat Explanation.” According to the former explanation, possessing sufficiently strong higher-order evidence to indicate that one’s belief about p fails to be rational is necessary and sufficient for defeating one’s belief about p. I argue that this type of explanation (...) is defective or at best collapses into the other type of explanation. According to the latter explanation, Believing that one’s belief about p fails to be rational (in response to higher-order evidence about p) is necessary and sufficient for defeating one’s belief about p. I argue that this type of explanation is better suited to explain higher-order defeat given that what one is rational to believe partly depends on the relations among one’s doxastic attitudes. Finally, I address an peculiar feature of the Subjective Higher-Order Defeat Explanation: higher-order defeat becomes contingent on one’s response to the higher-order evidence. (shrink)

In this paper, I contend that there are at least two essential traits that commonly define being an I: self-identity and self-consciousness. I argue that they bear quite an odd relation to each other in the sense that self-consciousness seems to jeopardize self-identity. My main concern is to elucidate this issue within the range of the transcendental philosophies of Immanuel Kant and Edmund Husserl. In the first section, I shall briefly consider Kant’s own rendition of the problem of the Egosplitting. (...) My reading of the Kantian texts reveals that Kant himself was aware of this phenomenon but eventually deems it an unexplainable fact. The second part of the paper tackles the same problematic from the standpoint of Husserlian phenomenology. What Husserl’s extensive analyses on this topic bring to light is that the phenomenon of the Ego-splitting constitutes the bedrock not only of his thought but also of every philosophy that works within the framework of transcendental thinking. (shrink)

Since the publication of Kitcher’s influential paper The Division of Cognitive Labor, some philosophers wondered about these two related issues: (1) which is the optimal distribution of cognitive efforts among rival methods within a scientific community?, and (2) whether and how can a community achieve such an optimal distribution? Though not committing to any specific answer to question (1), I claim that issue (2) does not depend exclusively on an invisible hand like mechanism, since both intra-scientific and extra-scientific institutions may (...) play a major role. Finally, I examine some practical difficulties of reallocating scientists from a method to another, which leads to stress the importance of well-planned training and recruitment. (shrink)

What are fictional emotions and what has phenomenology to say about them? This paper argues that the experience of fictional emotions entails a splitting of the subject between a real and a phantasy ego. The real ego is the ego that imagines something; the phantasy ego is the ego that is necessarily co-posited by any experience of imagining something. Fictional emotions are phantasy emotions of the phantasy ego. The intentional structure of fictional emotions, the nature of their fictional object, as (...) well as the process of constituting the phantasy ego in representificational acts of consciousness are further elaborated to provide the groundwork for a phenomenological analysis of fictional emotions. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to account for the (metaphorical) movement of the property of being present (or presentness) within the so-called Moving Spotlight Theory (MST). I will be leveraging the key argument by Emanuele Severino’s masterpiece, 'La Gloria' (2001), according to which it is impossible that a (maximal consistent) state of affairs begins to appear and lasts forever in our experience. After a brief overview of the MST’s main tenets (§1.1), I argue that Severino’s ontology might be interpreted (...) as a sort of MST (§1.2), following the hint by Federico Perelda (2017). Thereafter, I briefly recall Severino’s original argument in his own jargon, also proposing English lexical and conceptual translations of the main Italian phrases (§1.3). Then, I propose both a semi-formalization of Severino’s argument (§2.1) and a full formalization by means of temporal logic (§2.2). Finally, I assess all the three versions of the argument, concluding that my formalization might account for the movement of presentness in a non-metaphorical way (§2.3). (shrink)

In this contribution, I explore the possibility of characterizing the emergence of time in causal set theory (CST) in terms of the growing block universe (GBU) metaphysics. I show that although GBU seems to be the most intuitive time metaphysics for CST, it leaves us with a number of interpretation problems, independently of which dynamics we choose to favor for the theory —here I shall consider the Classical Sequential Growth and the Covariant model. Discrete general covariance of the CSG dynamics (...) does not allow us to individuate a single history of the universe (defined by a causal history of different causal sets), thereby making the claim that ‘the past exists’ at best problematic. In addition, because the evolution of the universe in CSG dynamics leads to an outward branching causal tree, it becomes impossible to determine a proper ‘line of becoming’, thereby blurring the presentists’ claim that only the present exists. Similarly, the covariant approach runs into the same, if not even more severe problems, since each configuration of the universe would amount to a set of possible causal sets, thereby making the individuation of a single configuration of the universe —and thus the physical interpretation of the theory— implausible. (shrink)

In this paper, I contend that there are at least two essential traits that commonly define being an I: self-identity and self-consciousness. I argue that they bear quite an odd relation to each other in the sense that self-consciousness seems to jeopardize self-identity. My main concern is to elucidate this issue within the range of the transcendental philosophies of Immanuel Kant and Edmund Husserl. In the first section, I shall briefly consider Kant’s own rendition of the problem of the Ego-splitting. (...) My reading of the Kantian texts reveals that Kant himself was aware of this phenomenon but eventually deems it an unexplainable fact. The second part of the paper tackles the same problematic from the standpoint of Husserlian phenomenology. What Husserl’s extensive analyses on this topic bring to light is that the phenomenon of the Ego-splitting constitutes the bedrock not only of his thought but also of every philosophy that works within the framework of transcendental thinking. (shrink)

This study evaluates the relationship between mental health and academic motivation among third-year college TES grantees. Thus, correlational design was employed to determine if there is a significant relationship between mental health and academic motivation among 150 third-year TES grantees. Statistical findings reveal that the r coefficient of 0.52 indicates a moderate positive correlation between the variables. The p-value of 0.00, which is less than 0.05, leads to rejecting the null hypothesis. Hence, a significant relationship exists between mental health and (...) academic motivation of third-year college TES grantees. Implications were discussed in the study. (shrink)

According to the extended cognition thesis, an agent’s cognitive system can sometimes include extracerebral components amongst its physical constituents. Here, we show that such a view of cognition has an unjustifiably anthropocentric focus, for it tends to depict cognitive extensions as a human-only affair. In contrast, we will argue that if human cognition extends, then the cognition of many non-human animals extends too, for many non-human animals rely on the same cognition-extending strategies humans rely on. To substantiate this claim, we (...) will proceed as follows. First (Sect. 1), we will introduce the extended cognition thesis, exposing its anthropocentric bias. Then, we will show that humans and many non-human animals rely on the same cognition-extending strategies. To do so, we will discuss a variety of case studies, including “intrabodily” cognitive extensions such as the spinal cord (Sect. 2), the widespread reliance on epistemic actions to solve cognitive tasks (Sect. 3) and cases of animal cognitive offloading (Sect. 4). We’ll then allay some worries our claim might raise (Sect. 5) to then conclude the paper (Sect. 6). (shrink)

In this article, I address a controversial aspect of Rawls’s treatment of the question of justice between generations: how the parties in the original position could be motivated to select Rawls’s preferred principle of intergenerational savings, which he dubs the just savings principle. I focus on the explanation found in his later work, where he proposes that the correct savings principle is the principle that any generation would have wanted preceding generations to have followed. By expanding upon this explanation, I (...) respond to the objection that this explanation disregards the perspective of the first generation. I demonstrate that this objection ceases to be a concern when a proper account of the parties’ reasoning is developed. What is notable about the explanation I defend is that it relies on the parties adopting maximax – not maximin – as a rule for rational decision making. Having established this intermediary conclusion, I depart with Rawls and consider what savings principle the parties would choose if given more options. Ultimately, I argue that the parties would select a principle that Rawls would have undoubtedly rejected if presented to him at face value. This is because the principle of savings I argue would be selected requires continual economic growth over generations to increase upwards indefinitely – a conclusion Rawls is explicitly trying to avoid in his theory of justice. (shrink)

The standard view of classical cognitive science stated that cognition consists in the manipulation of language-like structures according to formal rules. Since cognition is ‘linguistic’ in itself, according to this view language is just a complex communication system and does not influence cognitive processes in any substantial way. This view has been criticized from several perspectives and a new framework (Embodied Cognition) has emerged that considers cognitive processes as non-symbolic and heavily dependent on the dynamical interactions between the cognitive system (...) and its environment. But notwithstanding the successes of the embodied cognitive science in explaining low-level cognitive behaviors, it is still not clear whether and how it can scale up for explaining high-level cognition. In this paper we argue that this can be done by considering the role of language as a cognitive tool: i.e. how language transforms basic cognitive functions in the high-level functions that are characteristic of human cognition. In order to do that, we review some computational models that substantiate this view with respect to categorization and memory. Since these models are based on a very rudimentary form of non-syntactic ‘language’ we argue that the use of language as a cognitive tool might have been an early discovery in hominid evolution, and might have played a substantial role in the evolution of language itself. (shrink)

This work addresses a broad range of questions which belong to four fields: computation theory, general philosophy of science, philosophy of cognitive science, and philosophy of mind. Dynamical system theory provides the framework for a unified treatment of these questions. ;The main goal of this dissertation is to propose a new view of the aims and methods of cognitive science--the dynamical approach . According to this view, the object of cognitive science is a particular set of dynamical systems, which I (...) call "cognitive systems". The goal of a cognitive study is to specify a dynamical model of a cognitive system, and then use this model to produce a detailed account of the specific cognitive abilities of that system. The dynamical approach does not limit a-priori the form of the dynamical models which cognitive science may consider. In particular, this approach is compatible with both computational and connectionist modeling, for both computational systems and connectionist networks are special types of dynamical systems. ;To substantiate these methodological claims about cognitive science, I deal first with two questions in two different fields: What is a computational system? What is a dynamical explanation of a deterministic process? ;Intuitively, a computational system is a deterministic system which evolves in discrete time steps, and which can be described in an effective way. In chapter 1, I give a formal definition of this concept which employs the notions of isomorphism between dynamical systems, and of Turing computable function. In chapter 2, I propose a more comprehensive analysis which is based on a natural generalization of the concept of Turing machine. ;The goal of chapter 3 is to develop a theory of the dynamical explanation of a deterministic process. By a "dynamical explanation" I mean the specification of a dynamical model of the system or process which we want to explain. I start from the analysis of a specific type of explanandum--dynamical phenomena--and I then use this analysis to shed light on the general form of a dynamical explanation. Finally, I analyze the structure of those theories which generate explanations of this form, namely dynamical theories. (shrink)

I begin by briefly reconstructing Honneth’s concept of reification. His paradigm gives the reification of the non-human environment a marginal position in comparison to the reification of human beings, thereby detracting from its explanatory and critical potential. In order to avoid this outcome, I subsequently present a paradigm of subject identity formation in which not only affectively-based intersubjective interactions but also affectively-based interactions with the non-human environment are, in both a “genetic” and a “conceptual” sense, essential to establish an objective (...) and meaningful relationship with external reality. On the basis of this paradigm a closer connection can be identified between the reification of human beings and the reification of the non-human environment—a connection in which the reification of the latter may reinforce human reification. (shrink)

The paper presents and discusses the Hubble tension with respect to recent results in cosmology. I shall argue that the measurements from the James Webb Space Telescope and TRGB stars calibrations allow us to infer that the estimates of H0 with late universe methods are robust. Building on from robustness analysis, I conclude that the resolution of the tension cannot be expected to come from new systematics, but rather from new physics.

Combining typical knowledge to generate novel concepts is an important creative trait of human cognition. Dealing with such ability requires, from an AI perspective, the harmonization of two conflicting requirements that are hardly accommodated in symbolic systems: the need of a syntactic compositionality (typical of logical systems) and that one concerning the exhibition of typicality effects (see Frixione and Lieto, 2012). In this work we provide a logical framework able to account for this type of human-like concept combination. We propose (...) a nonmonotonic Description Logic of typicality called TCL (Typicality-based Compositional Logic). (shrink)

Online identification is a common problem but so far resolved unsatisfactorily, as consumers cannot fully control how much data they share and with whom. Self-Sovereign Identity (SSI) technology promises to help by making use of decentralized data repositories as well as advanced cryptographic algorithms and protocols. This paper examines the effects of SSIs on responsible, confident, and vulnerable consumers in order to develop the missing understanding of consumer needs in SSI adoption and define preconditions and necessary considerations for the development (...) of SSI-based platforms and applications. (shrink)

The extended mind thesis claims that a subject’s mind sometimes encompasses the environmental props the subject interacts with while solving cognitive tasks. Recently, the debate over the extended mind has been focused on Markov Blankets: the statistical boundaries separating biological systems from the environment. Here, I argue such a focus is mistaken, because Markov Blankets neither adjudicate, nor help us adjudicate, whether the extended mind thesis is true. To do so, I briefly introduce Markov Blankets and the free energy principle (...) in Section 2. I then turn from exposition to criticism. In Section 3, I argue that using Markov Blankets to determine whether the mind extends will provide us with an answer based on circular reasoning. In Section 4, I consider whether Markov Blankets help us track the boundaries of the mind, answering in the negative. This is because resorting to Markov Blankets to track the boundaries of the mind yields extensionally inadequate conclusions which violate the parity principle. In Section 5, I further argue that Markov Blankets led us to sidestep the debate over the extended mind, as they make internalism about the mind vacuously true. A brief concluding paragraph follows. (shrink)

Within the field of neuroscience, it is assumed that the central nervous system is divided into two functionally distinct components: the brain, which does the cognizing, and the spinal cord, which is a conduit of information enabling the brain to do its job. We dub this the “Cinderella view” of the spinal cord. Here, we suggest it should be abandoned. Marshalling recent empirical findings, we claim that the spinal cord is best conceived as an intrabodily cognitive extension: a piece of (...) biological circuitry that, together with the brain, constitutes our cognitive engine. To do so, after a brief introduction to the anatomy of the spinal cord, we briefly present a number of empirical studies highlighting the role played by the spinal cord in cognitive processing. Having so done, we claim that the spinal cord satisfies two popular and often endorsed criteria used to adjudicate cases of cognitive extension; namely the parity principle and the so-called “trust and glue” criteria. This, we argue, is sufficient to vindicate the role of the spinal cord as an intrabodily mental extension. We then steel our case considering a sizable number of prominent anti-extension arguments, showing that none of them poses a serious threat to our main claim. We then conclude the essay, spelling out a number of far-from trivial implications of our view. (shrink)